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Making a Difference: Human Service
Interest Group Influence on Social
Welfare Program Regulations
RICHARD HOEFER, PH.D.
University of Texas at Arlington
School of Social Welfare

Social workers increasinglyunderstand the importanceof politicalaction to
affect legislativepolicy-making. This papersheds light onto the unexplored
subject of interestgroup influence on the executive branch, specifically on
the writing of program regulationsfor social welfare programs.It describes
groups active in the process and what they do in their quest for influence. It
also presentsa preliminarymodel of interest group influence on regulation
writing. Results show that having greater access, articulating a liberal
policy position, choosing a "better" strategyand devoting more resources
to influence efforts are all significantpredictorsof a group's influence level
during the Clinton Administration.

INTRODUCTION
Political advocacy and social work are inseparable. The National Association of Social Workers Code of Ethics makes this
clear (National Association of Social Workers, 1996). A considerable body of literature exists regarding the importance of advocacy and the need for social workers to engage in the political
process (for a few recent examples, see Domanski, 1998; Haynes
and Mickelson, 1997; Hoefer, in press; Jansson, 1999; Richan,
1996). Most literature for social workers focuses on influencing
law-making.
While considerable work on group influence has been conducted with regard to legislatures, much less work is available
concerning group influence on the executive branch, especially
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in the rulemaking process. This omission is curious because the
importance of understanding how regulations are created is wellknown. As Harris and Milkis state: "Regulatory politics-the
struggle for control over the administrative levers of power and
policy shaped within government agencies-is central to government activity in the United States" (Harris and Milkis, 1989: viii).
A few authors have focused specifically on the need to monitor and advocate program regulations (Albert, 1983; Bell and Bell,
1982; Haynes and Mickelson, 1997; Jansson, 1999). These authors
point out the importance of executive branch decision-making but
do not present empirical research concerning how it is similar to
and different from legislative lobbying.
Although non-legislative policy-making is a very important
aspect of group influence over policy, it is still a neglected area
of research, especially in social welfare where changes in program rules can have dramatic impacts on individual recipients of
aid and services (Berry, 1984; Brodkin, 1986; Lipsky, 1984; West,
1985). As noted by Ripley and Franklin (1987) and Kerwin (1994),
changing social welfare regulations without going through the
legislative process first became an important way to alter policy
during President Reagan's terms of office. Such efforts continue
today at the federal level and exist at the state level, too.
Ultimately, a better understanding of the correlates of influence may help social workers perform their executive branch
advocacy efforts more effectively, resulting in better programs for
clients. The objectives of this research are thus to describe how
human services interest groups try to influence social welfare
policy regulations and to test a model of self-reported interest
group effectiveness in influencing the content of social welfare
regulations. We first describe the regulation-writing process, then
review the literature on interest group effectiveness in influencing
policy. The methods used in this study are next specified. After
a discussion of the research results, implications for social work
advocates are presented.
WHAT IS THE REGULATION WRITING PROCESS?
Regulations (also known as rules) are written as described
in the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946. Kerwin (1994) has
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described the process as consisting of eleven steps. For this paper,
we condense these steps into three stages (see Figure 1). The first,
"pre-publication", stage sets the process in motion and ends with
publication of the draft rule in the FederalRegister. Decisions are
made regarding the legislative authority for the rule, ideas are discussed for what might be in the rule and authorization is granted
to proceed. Staff are assigned and the goal of the regulation is
established. The draft rule is developed and is reviewed by both
internal and external actors. While much of this stage is seemingly
invisible, as with any project, the quality of the preparation has a
strong impact on the quality of the results.
The second, "post-publication", stage consists of public participation and taking action on the draft rule. At this stage, the
agency decides how to manage public input such as choosing
between requesting written comments and holding public hearings. After information is received, it must be read, analyzed
and folded into the proposed rule, or refuted. There are many
alternative courses of action, ranging from preparing the final
rule with no changes from the draft rule, making minor or major
Figure 1
Steps and Stages of the Regulation-WritingProcess
Kerwin's Steps
1. Origin of rulemaking activity
2. Origin of individual rulemaking
3. Authorization to proceed with rulemaking
4. Planning the rulemaking
5. Developing the draft rule
6. Internal review of the draft rule
7. External review of the draft rule
8. Revision and publication of a draft rule
9. Public participation
10. Action on the draft rule
11. Post-rulemaking activities

Hoefer's Stages
1. Pre-publication

2. Post-publication
3. Post-adoption

Source: Adapted from Cornelius M. Kerwin (1994), Rulemaking: How Government
Agencies Write Law and Make Policy, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly
Press, pp. 76-77.
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changes, abandoning the rulemaking effort and beginning over,
to the most extreme case, deciding that no rulemaking will take
place at all (Kerwin, 1994).
The final, post-adoption, stage takes place after the adoption
of the final rule. Actions that take place here include interpretations by staff of vague or unclear portions of the rule, corrections,
responding to petitions for reconsideration of the rule and preparing for litigation.
This research examines the whole range of interest group
activities that try to influence the regulation writing process, at
whatever stage they occur.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Because of cutbacks in government funding for human services, many nonprofit service providers and advocacy groups
experienced difficulty in surviving the 1980s and 1990s. Some
studies noted that changes in program regulations were one approach used to effect change. Expansive rules were rescinded or
ignored. New rules were made to reduce government's responsibility and to reduce expenditures (Brodkin, 1990; Lipsky, 1984).
These changes were accomplished by:
...
strengthening the authority of the OMB to screen regulations
promulgated by the regular bureaucracy, carefully selecting personnel who would support the administration's program to staff agency
and department positions, (and) devolving regulatory authority to
the states" (Harris and Milkis, 1989:99).

What Makes a Group Influential?
Much has been written in the political science literature on
the determinants of interest group influence at the national level,
primarily on Congress. This research is, however, divided in its
conclusions. Several authors contend that interest groups have
little effect (Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 1967; Meier and Lohuizen,
1978; Milbrath, 1963; Wilson, 1973). Others believe that, under
some conditions, interest groups are likely to be effective (AustenSmith and Wright, 1994; Greenwald, 1977; Herring, 1929; Knocke
and Wood, 1981; Whiteley and Winyard 1983; Ziegler, 1964).
Research that has found that interest groups can make a difference have identified a number of factors internal and external
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to the organization that are associated with success. Variables
internal to groups are the:
1. degree of access to decision-makers (Greenwald, 1977;
Culhane and Hacker, 1988),
2. organization's policy positions (Greenwald, 1977; Ziegler,
1964),
3. type of strategy used by the group (Gais and Walker, 1991).
4. amount of other organizational resources (especially
funding) (Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 1967; Greenwald, 1977;
Herring, 1929; Knocke and Wood, 1981),
5. amount of information a group can offer decision-makers
(Austen-Smith and Wright, 1994; Meier and Lohuizen, 1978;
Milbrath, 1963; Whiteley and Winyard, 1983),
6. type of group members (Greenwald, 1977; Walker, 1983;
Ziegler, 1964), and
7. size and dispersal of the membership (Greenwald, 1977;
Herring, 1929; Milbrath, 1963),
Variables external to the group which are associated with
success are the
8. type of issue (Greenwald, 1977),
9. the predispositions of the decision-makers (Bauer, Pool and
Dexter, 1964; Culhane and Hacker, 1988; Herring, 1929;
Whiteley and Winyard, 1983) and
10. the place of the group in the interorganizational system
(Greenwald, 1977; Knocke and Wood, 1981; Ziegler, 1964).
All of these writings focus on the legislative branch. As noted
before, little research has been conducted on interest group effectiveness in impacting the executive branch. One excellent exception is Berry (1984). In looking at the Food Stamp program, Berry
indicates that one group, the Food Research and Action Council
(FRAC), was successful in affecting policy within the executive
branch because of its "exceptional understanding of how the
program worked" (Berry, 1984: 93). FRAC also turned to court
decisions at a time when "public opinion and media coverage
became less favorable" (Berry; 1984: 90). Furlong (1992) tested
many of the variables associated in the literature with successful
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legislative lobbying to determine their relevance to rulemaking.
They were either not significant or not consistently significant
across the several ways he used to measure influence. His study,
however, has several methodological problems, including a very
low response rate (8%).
METHODOLOGY
The information reported in this paper comes from a mailed
survey of Washington-based interest groups active in social welfare policy, broadly defined. These groups were identified through
the Washington Information Directory (Congressional Quarterly,
1993) as being interested in issues related to social welfare. In
order to be included in the survey population, a group needed to
be listed in the Directory as being active in monitoring and trying
to affect the content of regulations promulgated by the executive
branch as well as trying to affect legislation. A phone contact was
made to determine if the Directoryinformation was correct and to
ask for the name of the person most connected with influencing
the executive branch.
The survey was pre-tested on a small group of organizations
and personal interviews were conducted with ten organizations'
executive directors or lobbyists before finalizing the instrument.
A typical mail survey process was used: an initial mailing
to all groups, a postcard "Thank you" /reminder ten days later,
and a second full mailing to all non-respondents two weeks later.
Because of the importance of each group's response, we also sent
a "third and final" mailing to non-respondents six weeks later.
Of the 295 groups initially sent surveys, usable responses were
received from 127, for a response rate of 43%.
RESULTS
The first part of this section looks at the data gathered on
the variables noted in the literature review as being important
correlates of interest group success, focusing on variables internal
to the groups. The instrument used did not measure variables external to the group. We then test a model of human service interest
group influence on regulation-writing using this information.

Making a Difference

27

Degree of Access
Two questions were asked regarding the degree of access
a group has with relevant executive branch agencies. The first
question asked if government agencies consulted with the group
for its policy positions. Nearly three-fourths (72%) of the 126
responding groups said yes. These groups can be considered
privileged in that their access is high and is initiated by the
government agency.
A less dichotomous way of looking at access was achieved
by asking respondents to rank the importance to their group of
learning about upcoming changes in regulations from agency
personnel. The more important this approach is, the better access
the group has. Three-fifths of groups (60%) feel this is a very
important or most important way they have to gain information.
One-fifth (21%) believe it is unimportant or not very important.
and 4% do not receive information in this way. The remaining
15% view it as somewhat important.
Policy Positions
The groups in this data set generally desire more federal government services in the areas of health, housing, human services
and civil rights (see Table 1, Part A). There is less desire for
additional federal regulation in these areas, although between
about one-half and two-thirds of the groups believe that more
or much more regulation would be good (see Table 1, Part B).
These results in the areas of health, housing, human services and
civil rights contrast dramatically with organizations' views on
defense policy, where there is a strong desire for fewer defense
services and regulations. In aggregate, then, these groups could
be labeled as "liberal" although there are a few groups espousing
more conservative positions.
An additional way to look at a group's policy position visA-vis the bureaucracy is to determine if the government agency
with which the group most often interacts is "in accord with" the
group's position. Group leaders were asked to respond to a statement that "Agency officials oppose our policy position." Onefourth (26%) stated that they agreed or strongly agreed with the
statement. Nearly half (47%) disagreed or strongly disagreed with
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Table 1

Policy Positions of Groups
Part A: Regarding Federal Services
(percent stating agreement with policy option)
Health Housing Human Services Civil Rights
(n=85) (n=82)
(n=92)
(n=84)

Defense
(n=62)

Desire More or Many More Federal Services
93%
85%
84%

73%

2%

Desire Somewhat Less or Much Less Federal Services
2%
5%
8%

4%

89%

Civil Rights
(n=68)

Defense
(n=38)

55%

24%

Desire Somewhat Less or Much Less Federal Regulation
21%
34%
22%
19%

47%

Part B: Regarding Federal Regulation
(percent stating agreement with policy option)
Health Housing Human Services
(n=71) (n=65)
(n=69)
Desire More or Much More Federal Regulation
62%
45%
49%

Note: The scale for this question had the following options: Much More, Somewhat More, Present Level, Somewhat Less, Much Less. Respondents could also
indicate that their group had no position on the issue. Only groups with a
position on the issue are included in the percentages.

the statement. The remaining groups were neutral. In general
then, most groups find that "their" government agency does not
reject their views, although a significant minority must seemingly
work to overcome some or considerable skepticism regarding
their ideas.
Strategy
There are many tactics that interest groups can choose to influence regulation writing. Table 2 lists thirteen specific tactics, the
percent of groups that indicate that each tactic was an "important"
or "one of the most important" tactics used to achieve influence,
and the percent of groups that never use the tactic.
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Table 2
Efforts Made to Influence the Executive Branch's Regulations about
Human Services Programs,(n = 127) (Strategy in parentheses)
Tactic

Important or
most important Do not use

Build coalition with other groups
(Coalition-building)

65%

Bring current regulations to attention of
Congress (Pre-publication)

60

8

Bring current regulations to attention of
executive branch (Pre-publication)

57

9

Provide information to other groups about
the regulation (Coalition-building)

55

9

Take desired changes in proposed regulations
to Congress (Post-publication)

52

11

Take desired changes in proposed regulations
to agency personnel (Post-publication)

52

11

Participate in public hearings about proposed
regulations (Post-publication)

45

11

Offer drafts of desired regulations prior to
publication of draft regulations in the
Federal Register (Pre-publication)

30

28

Take desired changes in proposed regulations
to the White House (Post-publication)

26

17

Use press to affect elite opinion about
regulations (Press)

25

26

Use press to affect public opinion about
regulations (Press)

24

25

Take desired changes in proposed regulations
to OMB (Post-publication)

17

30

6

63

Take adopted regulations to court
(Post-adoption)

11%

Note: The scale for this question had the following options: Most Important,
Important, Somewhat Important, Slightly Important, Unimportant, and Not
Used.
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These tactics have also been classified according to when they
are usually used in the regulation-writing process. This leads to
identifying three intervention strategies: before the publication
of the proposed rule in the FederalRegister (pre-publication), after publication but before adoption (post-publication); and after
adoption (post-adoption). Some tactics cannot be categorized in
this way, as they can be used at any time in the process. Two
different groups of tactics appear, the "coalition-building" and
the "press influence" approaches. The strategy each tactic is associated with is also indicated in Table 2.
The data indicate that the "coalition-building" strategy is
considered the most effective way to influence regulation writing.
On a scale from 1 to 6, with a higher number indicating more
importance is attached to the strategy, the mean score is 4.5. The
second most effective strategy is pre-publication, with a mean
of 4.3. This indicates that being proactive by bringing current
regulations to the attention of both Congress and the bureaucracy
to encourage action to change them (elements of a pre-publication
strategy) are also seen as being among the most effective ways
to be influential. The post-publication strategy, with a mean of
3.7, is in the middle ranks of effectiveness. The second strategy
that could take place at any time is press influence. It is in the
lower-middle ranks of effectiveness, with a mean of 3.1. Taking
regulations to court (the only tactic in the post-adoption strategy)
is seen as an effective tactic by very few groups (mean is 1.81).
Resources and Information to Provide to Decision-makers
According to popular perception and newspaper accounts,
interest groups with vast amounts of cash buy the votes of members of Congress. While the academic literature often finds that
this is not true, it is reasonable that some level of resources is very
important to groups. Money and staff are necessary to achieve an
organization's purposes. The survey asked each group to provide
its budget, but the non-response rate is so high on this question
that there is no sense in citing these data. Instead, we turn to
the use of staff size as a proxy variable for level of resources.
Staff, of course, cost money, and staff are used to gather and
disseminate information, so it is defensible to relate staff size with
organizational resources.
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The vast majority (97%) of the 124 responding groups have
staff. The median number of Staff FTEs is 11, with a range between
0 and 2000. Over half (59 %)of the groups reported increasing their
staff size compared to five years previous to the survey.
Because the level of staff effort in affecting policy may be
an important element in how successful a group is, we asked
respondents to estimate how much staff time was used to influence the executive branch. The median group reported that
20% of staff time is spent on such activity, although there was
a range from 1% to 100%. The best measure of group resources
devoted to advocacy is hypothesized to be a combination of the
number of organization staff and the amount of time they spend
in influence efforts. Thus, a new variable, staff advocacy effort,
was computed by multiplying the number of staff by the percent
of time spent on policy-work. Using this measure allows us to
compare organizational efforts better across groups. This variable
ranges from 0 to 173.25 staff FTEs allocated to policy work by
responding groups. The median value is 2.8 FTEs.
Type of Group Members and Size and Dispersalof Membership
Previous research noted that the type of member a group
has and the number and dispersal of the group's membership
could be important in determining how influential a group is. Our
research indicates that not all "groups" have members. Among
our respondents, only 74% were membership organizations. For
the membership organizations, there are three different patterns
of membership. Organizations have members who are organizations or their representatives (37%), individuals (27%), or a mix of
organizations and individuals (36%). The median number of organizational members is 4,500; the median number of individual
members is 4,000.
The Dependent Variable: Interest Group Effectiveness
Before explicating the model to be tested, it is important to
discuss the dependent variable, self-reported interest group effectiveness. There are a number of problems with using any selfreported measure, but there are reasons to accept such a measure
as well. First, there is little reason to suspect that respondents
would knowingly bias their answers to an academic survey; thus,
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they are used as expert witnesses as to their group's success rate.
Second, at least one study has shown that self-reported effectiveness was highly correlated with an objective measure of effectiveness (Hoefer, 1994). Finally, as no well-established measure of the
concept exists, it is acceptable to work with a measure that has
face validity in a research project that is primarily exploratory in
nature.
Groups feel successful in half of their efforts, on average, when
trying to affect regulations. The median is 50% success, with a
range from 0% to 100%. The standard deviation is 23.9.
Developing and Testing a Model of Interest Group Effectiveness
Because the literature on the determinants of affecting the
executive branch is relatively sparse, the model tested here is
also fairly basic and related to the variables considered important
in influencing Congress. It should thus be understood as a first
step in gaining a better understanding of the influence process
operating in the executive branch.
We use one variable to represent each of the factors found in
the literature review and discussed above, with two exceptions.
Because of the large number of non-membership organizations in
the sample, we excluded all information on membership size and
dispersal. In addition, staff advocacy effort is being used a proxy
variable for both level of organizational resources and amount of
information a group can provide to decision-makers.
When an option was present to choose between different
variables representing the same concept, each variable was tried
in the model. The final choice was made by selecting the variable
that most increased the model's fit. The final model hypothesizes
that a greater level of self-reported effectiveness is due to greater
access (measured by receiving information from agencies regarding changes in regulations), policy positions not opposed by the
agencies (measured by the extent of opposition by the agency),
a strategy emphasizing early intervention, and higher levels of
staff time devoted to advocacy efforts.
The results of testing this model using Ordinary Least Squares
regression are shown in Table 3. Although there were a total of
124 respondents, only 70 groups completed all the questions used
to measure the variables used in the equation. This attrition is unavoidable, but does reduce the representativeness of the results.
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Table 3
Results of OLS Regression on Model of Interest Group Influence on
Social Welfare Regulations (standarderror in parentheses)(n = 70)
Independent
Variable

Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients
Coefficients t-score p-value

Keep abreast of changes
through agency personnel
(ACCESS)

3.87

(1.79)

.22

2.17

.03

Group policy position
not opposed by agency
(POLICY POSITION)

3.95

(1.73)

.22

2.29

.03

Use of pre-publication
strategy (STRATEGY)

5.35

(2.02)

.27

2.64

.01

Staff advocacy effort
(RESOURCES)

.19

(.09)

.20

2.15

.04

2.22

.23

Constant
R-Square
F Score

14.08 (11.53)
.27
8.32

.00

All four variables are significant in the expected direction in
explaining the dependent variable. Effective groups use a "prepublication" strategy for influencing the content of regulations,
keep up with regulatory changes via agency personnel, generally
have policy positions not opposed by the agency and spend more
time trying to influence the executive branch.
Because the equation's r 2 is only .27, a considerable portion
of the variance in the dependent variable is unexplained. These
results do, however, indicate that we have taken a few steps on
the correct path in understanding what separates groups that
are effective in influencing federal regulations from those that
are not.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL WORK
This research sheds light onto the unexplored subject of interest group influence on the executive branch, specifically on
the writing of program regulations for social welfare programs.
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It presents a model of interest group influence on regulation
writing. Results show that having greater access, having the "correct" views, choosing a "better" strategy and devoting more
resources to influence efforts are all significant predictors of a
group's influence level during the Clinton Administration. That
a measure of each of the literature-derived variables of access,
strategy, policy and resources is significantly related to higher
group effectiveness is instructive. These findings indicate that
there is considerable hope for persons wishing to affect federal
social programs' regulations if they understand the pathways and
barriers to effective action.
One of the most interesting findings is that using a pre-publication strategy is very important in being effective. Because of
the strength of the group leaders' responses to coalition-building
tactics, we expected that building linkages with other groups and
sharing information between groups would have been significantly correlated with effective action. However, when that variable was used in the equation, the results were non-significant.
We believe the reason for this is that groups build coalitions and
share information throughout the process. Many groups "jump
on the bandwagon" in later stages of the process, once the rules
are essentially completed. We would expect, though we did not
test this hypothesis yet, that groups that build a coalition and
share information before publication of a rule will be the most
effective.
Additionally, the data indicate that being in contact with an
agency is not enough, even if its staff ask for a group's input.
This request may come too late in the process to be influential in
shaping the terms of the debate. It is when agency personnel keep
a group abreast of issues that this contact is helpful.
These results have important implications for social work
advocacy practice. The use of pre-publication tactics is shown
to increase the likelihood of success. This makes sense because
many of the crucial decisions concerning scope and content of
regulations are made during the writing stage (Kerwin, 1994).
After considerable effort is expended in preparing the draft rule
it is difficult to alter its course greatly. Thus, to influence the process most efficaciously, social workers should develop ongoing
relationships with agency personnel that lead to exchanges of
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information, rather than waiting to make contact after publication
in the FederalRegister.
Another implication for social workers is to be prepared with
ideas about how to change current or proposed regulations. Being
proactive is seen as an element leading to success. This requires
developing networks within the executive branch and reaching
out to the persons writing the regulations to discover the issues
that they see as likely to be controversial or problematic.
In the American system, there are multiple pathways in
policy-making, and, in some cases, different agencies within the
Federal bureaucracy may be assigned the job of writing the regulations that govern the implementation of a law. The implication
of knowing that human service interest groups have more success
with "friendly" agencies and personnel is to try to have the
regulation-writing task assigned to an agency and person with
which one has a good relationship.
We must also understand the connection between what makes
an agency "friendly" and social work lobbying groups' policy
positions. The reason that a liberal policy position may be helpful
in being effective in influencing the executive branch is due to the
policy positions of the President in office. The opposite was true
during the more conservative administrations of Presidents Reagan and Bush. One interest group representative for gay, lesbian
and transgendered individuals indicated that his group had had
no access to the regulation-writing civil servants during the Bush
years in the White House. Social workers should therefore increasingly realize the importance of national electoral politics on
what sometimes is seen as an obscure and unimportant element
of the policy process, the writing of regulations.
A final implication is that success in influencing social program regulations requires resources, and the more the better.
Money is translated into staff and other key resources for making
a difference. Social workers, if they are to create a more effective
voice for themselves and their clients, must thus be willing to
devote their funds to supporting the organizations that represent
them in the halls of power.
This current study leads to interesting and useful conclusions. Yet more work remains to be done in this area that is
of great importance to the study of social welfare policy. Two
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areas of improvement are most important. First, a more objective
definition of interest group influence should be used. One such
approach is to compare proposed and final regulations with interest group comments to see which groups' positions are more
often adopted (Furlong 1992; Hoefer, 1991). The second area of
improvement needed is to examine in more depth how best
to influence regulation-writers during the pre-publication stage.
This would include understanding the ways that other executive
branch agencies and personnel intervene in the rule-making process. These are important actors whose impact has not been well
studied. Given the increasing importance of interest groups at the
state level (Hoefer, in press), it would also be useful to study the
impact of human services interest groups at the state level.
CONCLUSION
Because of the importance of using rule-making authority
to impact human services programs, it is as vital to study how
influence is gained in the regulation-writing phase of a program
as it is in the legislative phase. While there are a few authors
who have discussed the importance of the topic, little empirical
research has been reported in social work literature. Building on
the beginning steps studied here will increase the ability of social
workers to protect and improve the lives of the least well-off in
our country.
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